Narges Fathalian; Ali Reza Mansouri
Abstract
The problem of time's arrow has sparked two distinct metaphysical approaches, each stemming from opposing Humean and non-Humean perspectives on laws of nature. This paper contends that these approaches, despite their differences and inherent challenges, ultimately converge on a common goal: to explain ...
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The problem of time's arrow has sparked two distinct metaphysical approaches, each stemming from opposing Humean and non-Humean perspectives on laws of nature. This paper contends that these approaches, despite their differences and inherent challenges, ultimately converge on a common goal: to explain time's arrow, we must comprehend the structure of spacetime during the universe's early stages. The problem of time's arrow has sparked two distinct metaphysical approaches, each stemming from opposing Humean and non-Humean perspectives on laws of nature. This paper contends that these approaches, despite their differences and inherent challenges, ultimately converge on a common goal: to explain time's arrow, we must comprehend the structure of spacetime during the universe's early stages.
Narges Fathalian; Alireza Mansouri
Abstract
Based on everyday experience and conventional understanding, there seems to be a difference between the past and the future, which we call the "arrow of time." There are different explanations for the time arrow, one of them is the thermodynamic arrow. However, the fundamental laws of physics, in particular ...
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Based on everyday experience and conventional understanding, there seems to be a difference between the past and the future, which we call the "arrow of time." There are different explanations for the time arrow, one of them is the thermodynamic arrow. However, the fundamental laws of physics, in particular Newton's laws and statistical mechanics, which we expect to explain the phenomenological laws of thermodynamics, do not show the asymmetry. Boltzmann tried to explain the thermodynamic asymmetry by proposing a "past hypothesis" for the early universe. According to this hypothesis, the early universe was in very special initial conditions. But this proposal encountered with many criticisms. While presenting the philosophical dimensions of the "arrow of time" problem and the critiques of the "past hypothesis", we argue that the assumption of a fundamental "time arrow" assumes that the past hypothesis alone is not sufficient to explain it. And there is a need for a more fundamental explanation that may change our view of space-time structure.
